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Depression is a common clinical disorder characterized by a complex web of
psychological, behavioral, and neurological causes and symptoms. Here we investigate
everyday beliefs and attitudes about depression, as well as the factors that shape the
depression schemas people hold. In each of three studies, participants read about a
person experiencing several symptoms of depression and answered questions about
their conception of the disorder. In some cases the symptoms were presented in
isolation while in other cases the symptoms were presented with a diagnostic label
and/or descriptions of its possible causes (e.g., genes versus personal experience).
Results indicated that beliefs and attitudes toward depression were largely shaped
by individual difference factors (e.g., personal experience, political ideology) and that
the experimental manipulations primarily impacted attributions of responsibility and
suggestions for a course of treatment. These findings represent an important advance
in our understanding of the factors that influence the folk psychiatry of depression and
help inform theories of schema formation for abstract and complex domains.
Keywords: schemas, depression, framing, folk psychiatry, concepts
INTRODUCTION
People use schematic knowledge structures to organize, interpret, and represent information about
the world around them (Bartlett, 1932; Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart, 1975; Schank and Abelson,
1975; Bransford, 1979). In one classic demonstration, people were better able to understand and
remember a description of a procedure for doing the laundry when they were told ahead of time
it was about “washing clothes” (i.e., when they had activated the relevant schema) than when they
were not given any contextual cues (Bransford and Johnson, 1972). This experiment, and many
others, illustrate that conceptual knowledge is richly structured and not simply an amalgam of
disconnected facts.
Decades of research have addressed questions of how schematic knowledge is learned, retrieved,
and used (e.g., Mandler, 1984; Rogers and McClelland, 2004). This work has identiﬁed nuanced
factors that moderate how information is weighted and deployed (e.g., certain domains prioritize
superﬁcial features, whereas other domains are organized around unobservable “essences”; e.g.,
Gelman and Wellman, 1991). For instance, in some cases manipulating a single word or short
phrase (i.e., linguistic framing) can change the schema that people bring to mind and, in turn,
change how people respond to information they are given (e.g., Kraut, 1973; Loftus, 1975; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1981; Walton and Banaji, 2004; Bryan et al., 2011; Thibodeau and Boroditsky,
2011, 2013, 2015); in other cases, more elaborate manipulations are required to instantiate and
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transfer a relevant schema for use in solving a target problem (see,
e.g., Gick and Holyoak, 1980, 1983).
In the present paper, we investigate several fundamental
issues about the nature of schematic knowledge for depression.
Although the studies are designed around this singular domain,
at the heart of our investigation are theoretical questions about
the nature of schematic knowledge. For example, to what
extent do diﬀerent labels (“depression” versus “neurological
disorder”) and causal explanations (experience versus genes) for
the condition aﬀect the way people conceptualize a person’s
struggle with depression (e.g., stigmatizing attitudes, beliefs about
the biological basis of the condition, etc.)?
One reason we focus our investigation on depression is
that psychological disorders (as well as other mental states,
emotions, and psychological constructs) are diﬃcult to classify
along dimensions that have been studied more extensively in
the cognitive sciences. On one hand, these domains are fairly
abstract in that they are not merely experienced through the
senses (e.g., touched, seen, smelled) and therefore do not ﬁt
within taxonomies of concrete things (e.g., artifacts versus natural
kinds; Gelman and Wellman, 1991). On the other hand, these
domains are also somewhat diﬀerent from classic examples of
abstract concepts (e.g., time, love, justice), at least for people
who have not suﬀered from depression, for which media
and language (e.g., metaphor) may be the primary source of
information about the subject (e.g., Lakoﬀ and Johnson, 1980;
Boroditsky, 2000). Indeed, the variability with which people have
personal experience with conditions like depression represents an
important opportunity for research on schematic knowledge in
cognitive science: to what extent does the subjective experience
of depression (e.g., symptoms, treatments, and discussions of the
disorder with friends, family, and health professionals) inﬂuence
conceptions of the disorder?
The present work seeks to understand the role of language
and causal explanations for depression. It builds on work on
conceptual knowledge in cognitive science as well as debates on
labeling in the context of psychiatric disorders (e.g., Goﬀman,
1963; Scheﬀ, 1966; Gove, 1975; Ahn et al., 2009; Dar-Nimrod
and Heine, 2011; Link and Phelan, 2013). In the context of
mental health, some have argued that labels carry a rich structure
of associations that can promote stereotyping and stigma (e.g.,
Scheﬀ, 1966). Evidence for such a view can be seen in anecdotes
from patients who describe their experience dealing with a
diagnosis (e.g., “it is important to understand that we are faced
with recovering not just from mental illness, but also from
the eﬀects of being labeled mentally ill,” Deegan, 1993, p. 10).
However, others have argued that labels have minor eﬀects on
how people think about mental illness and instead suggest that
symptoms and symptomatic behaviors cause people to develop
stigmatized attitudes toward disorders (e.g., Gove, 1975).
Given this debate, our focus on depression is also motivated
by practical concerns. Depression is among the most prevalent
mental disorders, aﬀecting more than 15million Americans every
year, and is a leading cause of disability claims worldwide (World
Health Organization [WHO], 2012). In recent years, arguments
over how to label mental disorders have resurfaced, motivated by
a desire to reduce stigmas associated with mental health issues
that represent a primary barrier to treatment (Us Department
of Health and Human Services, 1999). Many have pointed to
labels that emphasize the neurobiological component of mental
illness as tools for promoting a view that mental disorders
are similar to other less stigmatized “brain diseases” (Sartorius,
1997; US Department of Health and Human Services, 2003).
On this view, describing depression in terms of neurobiological
processes is thought to highlight the fact that mental disorders
have physiological markers and are caused by factors outside a
person’s control.
Data from the General Social Survey suggests that messaging
campaigns that emphasize the neurobiology of depression
have increased recognition of the condition’s physiological
underpinning (Pescosolido et al., 2010). For instance, between
1996 and 2006 there was a signiﬁcant increase in the percentage
of the population who viewed depression as resulting from
neurobiological causes (67% compared to 54%), as well as
increased support for depression-related treatment (Blumner and
Marcus, 2009). However, somewhat paradoxically, emphasizing
the neurobiological component of mental illness does not seem to
have reduced the stigma associated with depression (Pescosolido
et al., 2010).
In fact, some recent research suggests that biological accounts
of psychopathology can actually increase stigma – by making
patients seem even more diﬀerent from the rest of the population
and by increasing prognostic pessimism (Phelan et al., 2006;
Deacon and Baird, 2009; Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2011; Lebowitz
et al., 2013; Lebowitz and Ahn, 2014). Therefore, it is important
to rigorously assess how factors such as labeling inﬂuence
how people think and reason about depression and other
psychological disorders.
The Present Study
In three experiments we measure (a) people’s predisposition
to use psychological or neurobiological labels to characterize
depressive symptoms, (b) the associations that people have
with psychological and neurobiological labels for extended
descriptions of depressive symptoms, and (c) the causal power of
such labels and explanations to aﬀect attitudes and conceptions
of depression.
We considered two hypotheses. One possibility, in line with
the recommendations put forward by public health oﬃcials, is
that emphasizing the neurobiological component of depression
(e.g., calling it a “neurological disorder”) will lead people to adopt
a more compassionate view of those suﬀering from depression
(e.g., US Department of Health and Human Services, 2003).
Recognition of the neurobiological underpinning of depression
may decrease stigma toward the disorder, lead people to feel more
empathy with people suﬀering from the condition, and promote
the view that depression is a disease. In contrast, a second
possibility is that emphasizing the neurobiological component
of depression will not lead people to change their view of
the disorder or that it will actually increase people’s tendency
to stigmatize those suﬀering from depressive symptoms. For
instance, prior work has found that clinicians conceptualize
mental health disorders along a single continuum from the
highly biological to the highly psychological (non-biological or
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1728
Thibodeau et al. Depression Schema
behavioral; Ahn et al., 2009) and that using biological labels to
describe a given mental disorder (e.g., schizophrenia, depression,
obsessive–compulsive disorder) leads mental health clinicians
to empathize less strongly with patients suﬀering from the
conditions (Lebowitz and Ahn, 2014).
These accounts are contrasted in three experiments. In
Experiment 1 we presented participants with a narrative that
described a person suﬀering from depressive symptoms and
prompted them for a “diagnosis” for the protagonist (as
normal, a neurological disorder, or depression). We also gaged
various attitudes related to depression. In Experiment 2, we
manipulated the label used to describe a person experiencing
depressive symptoms – framing the protagonist’s experience
as resulting from “depression” or a “neurological disorder”
(we also included a condition in which the symptoms were
described without a label). In Experiment 3, we included a
more elaborate description of the physiology of depression
and identiﬁed either genes or a negative life experience as
a causal contributor to a person’s experience of depression.
This allowed us to test whether extended descriptions and
causal explanations would be more eﬀective than subtle
labeling manipulations in changing someone’s beliefs about
depression.
Of note, we also manipulated whether the protagonist in the
narrative was male or female. Depression disproportionately
aﬀects women (Kuehner, 2003), and therefore people’s
expectations (prior beliefs) about whether a pattern of symptoms
might be indicative of clinical depression may depend on
whether the individual is male or female. People also hold
diﬀerent stereotypical assumptions about the emotional lives of
men and women, and so might judge the same set of behaviors
diﬀerently depending on whether they conform to or violate
gender norms.
We expected that regardless of the label or explanation’s
eﬀect on stigma and empathy, emphasizing the neurobiological
component of depression would aﬀect judgments of how
the condition should be treated – with medication rather
than psychotherapy (cf. Ahn et al., 2009). We were also
interested in whether variability in patterns of diagnosis
(Experiment 1), the manipulation of the label (Experiment 2),
or the inclusion of a causal explanation (Experiment 3)
would aﬀect the degree to which participants empathized with
the protagonist, attributed responsibility to him or her for
their experience of depressive symptoms, viewed depression
as a disease, and exhibited stigmatized attitudes toward the
disorder.
Of note, we also collected several individual diﬀerence
measures and predicted that these factors (personal history
with depression, gender, political ideology) would inﬂuence
how people responded to the description of the protagonist.
Speciﬁcally, we predicted that liberals, people with more
education, women, and those with a personal experience with
depression would be more likely to view the condition as a
disease, more likely to empathize with those suﬀering from
depression, and more likely to suggest medical treatment options
(Skitka et al., 2002; Corrigan and Watson, 2007; Lebowitz et al.,
2013; Flusberg et al., 2015; Thibodeau et al., 2015).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We recruited and paid 200, 900, and 1200 participants in
Experiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively, through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Berinsky et al.,
2012). All three studies were conducted in accordance with
the recommendations of Oberlin College’s Institutional Review
Board and the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants indicated
their informed consent (by checking a box on the web-based
survey) before beginning the study.
We used Mechanical Turk’s exclusion capabilities to ensure
that participants lived in the US and had a good performance
record on previous tasks. At the end of the survey, participants
were assigned a random number to submit into the Turk
interface (see Table 1 for demographic information from all three
samples). Data were excluded from analysis if participants did
not provide an accurate completion code or if they contributed
data to an earlier experiment (e.g., data was omitted from analysis
of Experiment 2 from a small number of participants who had
participated in Experiment 1).
Determinations of sample size were guided by prior work
on similar issues (e.g., Thibodeau et al., 2015) and through
the use of a sample size calculator, which was speciﬁcally
designed to estimate the amount of data needed to construct
a structural equation model (Soper, 2015), which is presented
in supplementary material. Eﬀect sizes from prior work (e.g.,
Cohen’s d = 0.23 for a diﬀerence in empathy associated with
the manipulation of a label for depression in Lebowitz and Ahn,
2014) suggest that the studies reported here have statistical power
greater than 0.8 to detect possible diﬀerences in Experiments
2 (e.g., between the “depression” and “neurological disorder”
conditions) and Experiment 3 (e.g., between conditions that
included or excluded information about the neurobiological basis
of depression).
TABLE 1 | Sample information.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
N sampled 200 900 1200
N analyzed 189 847 1102
Gender: male 41% 52% 51%
Age (range: 18–76) M = 36.15
(SD = 12.42)
M = 33.13
(SD = 10.74)
M = 31.75
(SD = 10.34)
Education level: a
least some college
88% 90% 88%
Democrats 44% 47% 42%
Independents 31% 29% 41%
Republicans 25% 11% 17%
Ideology (100 = very
conservative)
M = 41.3
(SD = 27.5)
M = 37.8
(SD = 26.4)
M = 38.8
(SD = 25.7)
Personal history of
mental illness
48% 49% 55%
Diagnosed with
depression
26% 31% 33%
Demographic information about the samples for Experiments 1, 2, and 3.
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Of note, all samples included more Democrats and fewer
Independents than in the general American population. Recent
polling suggests that 32, 39, and 24% of Americans identify as
Democrats, Independents, and Republicans, respectively (Pew,
2015).
The proportion of participants who reported a history of
mental illness in general and depression speciﬁcally is in line with
recent national survey data, which estimated a 51% lifetime risk
of experiencing at least one anxiety (32%), mood (28%), impulse-
control (25%), or substance-abuse disorder (16%; Kessler et al.,
2005). The American Psychiatric Association classiﬁes depression
primarily as a mood disorder but also considers it to be a
component of anxiety, impulse-control, and substance-abuse
disorders (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013).
Narrative
In all three experiments, participants ﬁrst read a description
of someone experiencing ﬁve symptoms of depression (thereby
meeting the diagnostic criteria for clinical depression), taken
from the DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association [APA],
2013): trouble sleeping, tiredness, diﬃculty concentrating,
anhedonia, and weight loss. For half of the participants, the
protagonist’s namewas implied to be female (Jenny); for the other
half of participants, the protagonist’s namewas implied to bemale
(Mark).
In Experiment 1, the narrative read:
{Jenny/Mark} is a college student who has recently been having
trouble sleeping. S/He has been tired throughout the day,
regardless of how long s/he sleeps, and has been having trouble
concentrating in class. Activities s/he used to enjoy now feel like a
burden on his time. S/He lost a lot of weight recently and doesn’t
know why.
In Experiment 2, there were three versions of the narrative
(6 when accounting for the gender manipulation): one, the “no
label” version, was identical to that of Experiment 1; the other
two narratives introduced the protagonist with a label for their
symptoms – either “depression” or “neurological disorder” – in
the ﬁrst sentence (e.g., “Jenny/Mark is a college student who has
depression. S/He has recently. . .”).
In Experiment 3, there were six versions of the narrative (12
when accounting for the gender manipulation). Each narrative
included the paragraph above (with the “depression” label at
the beginning of the report). Half of the participants read
additional information about the neurological underpinning
of depression adapted from an article on depression (Miller,
2009):
Researchers have found a number of abnormalities in the
neurobiology of people with depression. There are at least three
brain regions that seem to work diﬀerently for people with
depression. For instance, the hippocampus tends to be smaller in
some depressed people. In addition, receptors of brain cells seem
to be oversensitive or insensitive to neurotransmitters, which
allow cells to communicate to one another.
Two thirds of participants read about one of two
potential causal factors for the protagonist’s depression.
One causal factor highlighted the role of genetic heritability in
depression:
Several of Mark/Jenny’s relatives also suﬀer from depression.
Researchers have found that depression is 40–50% heritable,
suggesting that the cause of depression for many people can be
traced to their genes.
A second causal factor highlight the role of personal
experience:
Mark/Jenny’s father died when she was young. Researchers have
found that profound early losses, such as the death of a parent,
may resonate throughout life, eventually expressing themselves as
depression.
These variations of the narrative in Experiment 3 can
be summarized as a two gender (Mark or Jenny) by two
neurological information (present or absent) by three causal
information (genetic, experiential, none) between-subjects
manipulation.
Manipulation Check
After reading the narrative, participants were asked to estimate
the age, race, gender, and political ideology of the protagonist.
Since the report did not suggest answers to questions about
the protagonist’s actual age, race or political ideology, these
questions were inherently speculative. They were included to
partially mask the more relevant question about the protagonists’
gender, which was included as amanipulation check of the gender
manipulation. In Experiments 1, 2, and 3, 100, 99, and 97% of
participants who read about Mark reported thinking that the
protagonist was male, and 100, 96, and 98% of participants who
read about Jenny reported thinking that the protagonist was
female, respectively.
Dependent Measures
After participants read the narrative, they were asked to make
several judgments about the protagonist, their symptomology,
and depression generally. Summary statistics and indicators of
reliability for the dependent measures are shown in Table 2.
Diagnosis
In Experiment 1 (but not Experiments 2 or 3), participants were
asked to categorize the protagonist’s symptoms as resulting from
“depression,” “a neurological disorder,” or “the normal ups and
downs of life” in a multiple choice question.
Treatment
In all three experiments, participants were asked whether
the protagonist should seek help (“yes” or “no”) and, if so,
what kind. There were four treatment options provided
that participants could choose between: “counseling,”
“prescription drugs,” “counseling and prescription drugs,”
or “alternative therapies.” We contrast the two treatment
options that included medication (i.e., “prescription drugs” and
“counseling and prescription drugs”) with the two treatment
options that did not (i.e., “counseling” and “alternative
therapies”).
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TABLE 2 | Dependent measures.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Diagnosis (multiple choice)
Depression 74% NA NA
Neurological Disorder 10%
Normal 16%
Seek Help? (% yes) 86% 97% 97%
Treatment (multiple choice)
(a) Counseling 70% 54% 66%
(b) Prescription drugs 4% 4% 2%
(c) Counseling and drugs 17% 28% 24%
(d) Alternative therapies 12% 13% 7%
Empathy (12 items) M = 3.87 (SD = 0.53) α = 0.768 M = 3.87 (SD = 0.58) α = 0.827 M = 3.95 (SD = 0.62) α = 0.834
Responsibility (3-point scale) M = 1.70 (SD = 0.61) M = 1.77 (SD = 0.59) M = 1.66 (SD = 0.62)
Depression as disease (101-point scale) M = 63.39 (26.92) M = 63.3 (SD = 27.74) M = 62.12 (SD = 27.57)
Depression Stigma (15 items) M = 1.92 (SD = 0.50) α = 0.765 M = 1.86 (SD = 0.55) α = 0.820 M = 1.92 (SD = 0.54) α = 0.803
Summary of dependent measures used in experiments.
Perceptions of the Protagonist
In all three experiments, participants then indicated the extent
to which they identiﬁed with the protagonist by completing a
10-item empathy scale (e.g., “I can really identify with what was
described in the message”; adapted from Campbell and Babrow,
2004). Ratings were made on a 5-point scale that ranged from
“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree.”
Following prior work on related issues (e.g., on the role of
personal narratives in conceptions of obesity; Niederdeppe et al.,
2014), we supplemented Campbell and Babrow (2004)’s empathy
scale with two additional questions: (1) “How similar do you
think you are to this character?” (rated on a 5-point scale from
“Very dissimilar” to “Very similar”); and (2) “To what extent
do you feel angry or frustrated toward the story’s protagonist?”
(rated on a 4-point scale from “Not at all” to “A strong amount
of frustration/anger”). For parsimony and clarity, we chose
to combine responses to these supplemental questions with
responses from the empathy scale (ratings of frustration were
reverse scored). The supplemental questions were conceptually
related to questions on the empathy scale, reﬂecting the degree to
which participants identiﬁed with the protagonist. Combing the
empathy scale with the supplemental questions also improved the
reliability of the metric: data from each of the three experiments
revealed greater internal consistency when the two supplemental
questions were averaged with the 10 items from the empathy
scale (Chronbach’s α increased from 0.734 to 0.768, from 0.823
to 0.843, and from 0.802 to 0.822 in Experiments 1, 2, and 3,
respectively).
Participants also indicated how responsible they thought the
protagonist was for feeling the way they did by answering the
question “How responsible do you think Jenny/Mark is for feeling
the way that s/he does?” on a 3-point scale that ranged from
“Not at all,” to “Somewhat,” to “Very” responsible. We used a 3-
point scale because we anticipated that participants would ﬁnd it
diﬃcult to distinguish between a more subtle range of response
options and because prior work has found that 3-point scales can
be just as valid and reliable as 5- or 7-point scales (Jacoby and
Matell, 1971).
Depression
Finally, we measured the extent to which participants considered
depression a disease and their feelings of stigma toward
the disorder. After recommending a course of treatment
and responding to questions about their perception of the
protagonist, participants were asked “To what extent do you
believe that mental health issues like depression are a lifestyle
problem (resulting from a lack of personal self control) versus
a disease?” on a 101-point scale where 0 was labeled “personal”
and 100 was labeled “disease.” Stigma was gaged with a 15-
item inventory (Arbanas, 2008), in which participants rated their
agreement with statements like “A person with depression is
dangerous and unpredictable” on a 5-point scale that ranged from
“Deﬁnitely no” to “Deﬁnitely yes.” Responses to the stigma scale
were aggregated; higher values reﬂect a more stigmatized view of
depression.
Individual Difference Measures
After the study, participants were asked a set of background
questions, including their personal history of mental illness, age,
gender, education level, annual salary, and political ideology (see
Table 1).
Data Analysis
To analyze dichotomous responses in all three experiments (i.e.,
for two dependent measures: whether or not the participant
suggested that the protagonist seek help and what type of help
the participant suggested that the protagonist seek), we compared
the ﬁt of nested logistic regression models. In Experiments 1
and 2 we compared four models: Model 1 did not include
predictor variables aside from the intercept; Model 2 included
dummy coded predictor variables for the diagnosis (Experiment
1: depression was treated as the “baseline” since it was the modal
response) or label (Experiment 2);Model 3 tested for amain eﬀect
of the gender of the protagonist and was compared to Model 2
(i.e., controlling for an inﬂuence of the diagnosis or label); and
Model 4 tested for an interaction between these factors. A similar
procedure was followed in Experiment 3, by testing for eﬀects of
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including neurobiological information about depression, a causal
explanation for depression, and the gender of the protagonist. In
every analysis, the deviance between the models (i.e., diﬀerence
in likelihood ratios) is reported as an index of model ﬁt: model
deviance approximates a chi-square distribution with the number
of added parameters as its degrees of freedom (Menard, 2002).
We report the results of chi-square tests for analyses that
involve categorical dependent measures with more than two
levels (i.e., the diagnosis question in Experiment 1) and ANOVAs
for analyses that involve interval scaled dependent measures.
RESULTS
Diagnosing the Symptoms
In Experiment 1, most people (74%) indicated that they thought
the protagonist was experiencing depression. Thus people tended
to recognize the description of the protagonist as the typical
experience of depression. However, there were also a fair number
of participants who identiﬁed the protagonist’s struggle as part
of the normal ups and downs of life (16%) and a small group
of participants who conceptualized the symptoms as the result
of a neurological disorder (10%). There was no diﬀerence in
the patterns of diagnosis by the gender of the protagonist,
χ2(2) = 1.66, p= 0.436.
Variability in the diagnosis allowed us to explore whether
diﬀerent conceptions of the symptoms were associated with
diﬀerent attitudes toward the protagonist and his or her
experience. However, given the relatively small number of
participants who diagnosed the protagonist with a neurological
disorder (n= 17) or as suﬀering from the normal ups and downs
of everyday life (n = 30), these analyses are limited in several
cases.
Treatment
In Experiment 1, 86% of participants suggested that the
protagonist seek help. People were particularly likely to suggest
that the protagonist seek help if they diagnosed him or her with
“depression” (98%) or a “neurological disorder” (90%). Fewer
participants suggested that the protagonist seek help when the
symptoms were thought to be a normal part of life (30%).
Logistic regression was used to model treatment suggestions. The
analyses revealed that participants suggested that the protagonist
should seek help at signiﬁcantly diﬀerent rates depending on
the diagnosis, χ2(2) = 72.965, p < 0.001 and that there was
no eﬀect of the gender of the protagonist on the patterns of
diagnosis, ps > 0.10. Participants were more likely to suggest
a course of treatment that included medication if they thought
the protagonist was experiencing a neurological disorder (47%)
than if they thought the protagonist was experiencing depression
(18%) or the normal ups and downs of everyday life (11%),
χ2(2) = 6.964, p = 0.031, which is consistent with prior work
(see, e.g., Ahn et al., 2009). There was no eﬀect of the gender of
the protagonist on treatment suggestions, ps> 0.4.
Given these results, we expected participants in Experiments
2 who were presented with a diagnostic label (“depression”
or “neurological disorder”) to be more likely to suggest that
the protagonist seek treatment. We also expected diﬀerences
in the kinds of treatment suggested as a function of the
label: a protagonist identiﬁed as suﬀering from a “neurological
disorder” may be especially likely to elicit suggestions to seek
pharmacological treatment. This is exactly what we found.
In Experiment 2, 97% of participants suggested that the
protagonist seek help. A logistic regression revealed that
participants were more likely to suggest that the protagonist
seek help when the narrative included a label (“depression”:
98%; “neurological disorder”: 99%) than when it did not (94%),
χ2(2)= 10.130, p= 0.006; there was no eﬀect of the gender of the
protagonist or an interaction between the two factors, ps > 0.15.
As expected, participants were more likely to suggest a
pharmacological approach to treatment when they received
the “neurological disorder” frame (52%) compared to when
the symptoms were identiﬁed as resulting from “depression”
(32%) or when they were unlabeled (29%), χ2(2) = 29.837,
p< 0.001 (see Figure 1). There was no eﬀect of the gender of the
protagonist, as a main eﬀect or as an interaction with the labeling
manipulation, ps > 0.2.
In Experiment 3, we did not expect to ﬁnd systematic
variability in whether participants thought the protagonist
should seek treatment because the protagonist was identiﬁed
as suﬀering from depression for all participants. However, we
did expect to ﬁnd diﬀerences in the kinds of treatment that
participants’ thought would be most appropriate as a function of
the experimental manipulations. We predicted that participants
would be more likely to suggest pharmacological treatment when
the narrative included information about the neurological basis
FIGURE 1 | Treatment. Proportions of participants who suggested
pharmacological treatment for the protagonist in Experiments 2 (left cluster of
three bars) and 3 (6 rightmost bars). For Experiment 2, the legend refers to
one of there frames; for Experiment 3, the legend refers to whether the
narrative included information about the physiological basis of depression.
Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
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of depression and when “genes” were identiﬁed as a likely causal
contributor to the person’s disorder. We found partial support for
these hypotheses.
As expected, Experiment 3 revealed no diﬀerences in the
proportion of participants who suggested that the protagonist
seek help (97% overall) by the experimental manipulations.
We did, however, ﬁnd diﬀerences in treatment suggestions by
causal explanation, χ2(2) = 6.374, p = 0.041, and an interaction
between causal explanation and neurobiological description,
χ2(2) = 8.004, p = 0.018 (see Figure 1). There were no eﬀects of
the gender of the protagonist on treatment suggestions, ps> 0.8.
As expected, participants were more likely to suggest
pharmacological treatment when they were given a neurological
description of depression overall. However, counter to what we
predicted, the results revealed that including a causal explanation
(either type) made people less likely to suggest medication –
especially when the protagonist was described as having a
negative early life experience.
There are at least two possible explanations for this seemingly
counter-intuitive ﬁnding. One is that identifying the protagonist
as suﬀering from “depression” at the beginning of the narrative
overpowered the inﬂuence of subsequent information about a
genetic basis for the disorder. A second possibility is that people
may not associate genetic disorders with medication. People
may be able to imagine how psychological treatment could be
appropriate for someone dealing with depression that results
from a negative life experience, but they do not seem to think
of medication as a more suitable treatment for depression that
results from a genetic predisposition for the condition.
Framed diﬀerently, we did not ﬁnd a simple relationship
between including biological information (describing a
neurological basis or identifying a genetic contribution for
the disorder) and endorsement of pharmacological treatment.
Instead, the results suggest a connection between thinking about
the eﬃcacy of pharmacological treatment when the neurological
basis of depression was emphasized but not when a genetic
basis for the condition was highlighted. However, it should be
noted that there are other biologically based treatments (e.g.,
gene therapy) that may be more congruent with an account of
depression that is grounded in genetics, which participants may
be more likely to support after reading about the heritability of
depression.
Perceptions of the Protagonist
In Experiment 1, we found no inﬂuence of participants’
diagnosis of the protagonist or the gender of the protagonist
on the measures of empathy, F[1,183] = 0.021, p = 0.885,
or responsibility, F[1,183] = 0.205, p = 0.651. This may have
been due to the lack of variability in treatment suggestions or
it may reﬂect a genuine lack of a relationship between how the
symptoms are labeled and the degree to which people empathize
with and attribute responsibility for someone experiencing those
symptoms.
Experiments 2 and 3 suggest support for the latter explanation
with respect to empathy: in both follow-up experiments, we
found no eﬀects of the experimental manipulations on the
measure of empathy, Fs < 1.65, ps > 0.2 (see Figure 2).
FIGURE 2 | Empathy. Ratings of empathy toward the protagonist (range:
1–5). For Experiment 2, the legend refers to one of there frames; for
Experiment 3, the legend refers to whether the narrative included information
about the physiological basis of depression. Error bars denote standard errors
of the means.
That is, diﬀerent diagnoses, labels, and causal explanations for
depressive symptoms did not seem to aﬀect the extent to which
people empathized with the person experiencing the symptoms.
Although this ﬁnding is inconsistent with one of the goals
of a messaging campaign that seeks to promote empathy and
decrease stigma by highlighting the biological basis of depression
(Sartorius, 1997; US Department of Health and Human Services,
2003), these results do not suggest a cost to such labels, as has been
found in some previous work (e.g., Phelan et al., 2006; Deacon
and Baird, 2009; Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2011; Lebowitz et al.,
2013; Lebowitz and Ahn, 2014).
However, we did ﬁnd eﬀects of the experimental
manipulations on the measure of personal responsibility in
Experiments 2 and 3 (see Figure 3). In Experiment 2, both the
“neurological disorder” (M = 1.71), t[565] = 3.170, p = 0.002,
d = 0.256, and “depression” labels (M = 1.73), t[566] = 2.793,
p = 0.005, d = 0.229, led people to attribute less responsibility
to the protagonist than the description of the symptoms alone
(M = 1.86), F[2, 841] = 5.750, p = 0.003, η2 = 0.013. There was
no diﬀerence in ratings of responsibility between the two labeled
conditions, t[557] = 0.430, p = 0.667. There was no eﬀect of
gender on perceptions of responsibility, Fs< 1, ps> 0.4.
In Experiment 3, there was a marginal main eﬀect of causal
explanation, F[2,1090] = 2.551, p = 0.079, η2 = 0.005.
Participants attributed slightly less responsibility to the
protagonist when he or she was described as having a negative
early life experience (M = 1.61) or when depression was
described as heritable (M = 1.66); participants attributed more
responsibility to the protagonist when the narrative lacked a
causal explanation (M = 1.72). There was no diﬀerence in
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FIGURE 3 | Responsibility. Perceptions of the protagonist’s personal
responsibility for their symptoms (range: 1–3). For Experiment 2, the legend
refers to one of there frames; for Experiment 3, the legend refers to whether
the narrative included information about the physiological basis of depression.
Error bars denote standard errors of the means.
attributions of responsibility as a function of the presence
(M = 1.63) or absence (M = 1.68) of a neurological description,
F[1,1090]= 2.010, p= 0.157; nor were there eﬀects of the gender
of the protagonist or two- or three-way interactions between
these factors, Fs< 2, ps > 0.15.
These results provide partial support for the view that
perceptions of responsibility are malleable and may be aﬀected
by a labeling manipulation (or including a causal explanation).
However, our results diﬀer from what has been proposed by
health practitioners, as there was no diﬀerence between the
“neurological disorder” and “depression” labels in Experiment 2
and no diﬀerence between conditions that included or omitted
more elaborate descriptions of the neurobiology of depression
in Experiment 3 (Sartorius, 1997; US Department of Health
and Human Services, 2003). Instead, these data suggest that
providing any label for a diverse set of symptoms might serve to
decrease attributions of responsibility. In other words, the act of
classiﬁcation itself, of linking these diﬀerent symptoms into an
overarching explanatory schema, may be suﬃcient to reduce the
sense that the individual is responsible for their behavioral and
emotional states.
Attitudes toward Depression
In Experiment 1, we found no relationship between participants’
patterns of diagnosis and their feelings of stigma toward the
disorder or their view of depression as a disease. Results of
Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that the degree to which people
stigmatize the disorder is relatively stable, as this measure was
not inﬂuenced by the experimental manipulations in either
follow-up study, Fs < 1.6, ps > 0.2 (see Figure 4). This
FIGURE 4 | Stigma. Stigma toward depression (range: 1–5). For Experiment
2, the legend refers to one of three frames; for Experiment 3, the legend refers
to whether the narrative included information about the physiological basis of
depression. Error bars denote standard errors of the means.
is consistent with recent polls and empirical work showing
that recognition of the neurobiological basis of depression
does not necessarily decrease the stigma associated with
the condition (Pescosolido et al., 2010; Lebowitz and Ahn,
2014).
However, in Experiment 2 conceptions of depression as a
disease were inﬂuenced by both the labeling manipulation and
the gender of the protagonist (see Figure 5). An interaction
between the label and the gender of the protagonist suggested
that the labels aﬀected conceptions of the protagonist when
the protagonist was female but not male, F[2,841] = 3.509,
p = 0.030, η2 = 0.008. Participants were least likely to
think of depression as a disease when the female protagonist’s
symptoms were described without a label (M = 57.22); they
were more likely to think of depression as a disease when
the symptoms followed the “depression” (M = 65.38) or
“neurological disorder” label (M = 68.15), F[2,278] = 3.909,
p = 0.021, η2 = 0.027. The diﬀerence between the no
label and “neurological disorder” conditions was signiﬁcant (at
the Bonferroni-corrected α = 0.017 level), t[185] = 2.712,
p = 0.007, d = 0.390. Diﬀerences between the “no label” and
“depression” conditions and between the “neurological disorder”
and “depression” conditions were not statistically signiﬁcant,
ts < 2, ps > 0.05. On the other hand, participants reported
similar conceptions of depression after reading about a male
protagonist (Ms = 62.82, 62.28, and 64.24 in the “neurological
disorder,” “depression” and no label conditions, respectively),
F[2,563]= 0.257, p= 0.773.
The gender diﬀerence may result from women being
stereotypically viewed as less agentic in general than men (Eagly,
1987) and less able to regulate their emotions. Therefore people
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FIGURE 5 | Disease. Perceptions of depression as a disease (range: 0–100).
For Experiment 2, the legend refers to one of there frames; for Experiment 3,
the legend refers to whether the narrative included information about the
physiological basis of depression. Error bars denote standard errors of the
means.
might be less likely to think of depression as a disease when the
symptoms are described in the context of a female protagonist.
In Experiment 3, we found no eﬀects of the experimental
manipulations on conceptions of depression as a disease,
Fs < 1.6, ps > 0.2 (see Figure 5). Despite recent survey data
indicating that views of depression as a disease are on the rise
(consistent with the eﬀorts of messaging campaigns; Pescosolido
et al., 2010), we did not ﬁnd that describing a protagonist as
suﬀering from a neurological disorder (or including a more
elaborate description of the physiological basis of depression)
made people more likely to view depression as a disease. Instead,
we found some indication, in the context of a female protagonist,
that people were more likely to view someone who is labeled with
any clinical condition (“depression” or “neurological disorder”)
as suﬀering from a disease relative to someone whose symptoms
are not classiﬁed.
Individual Differences
As predicted, in all three experiments we found that participants’
personal history with mental illness, their gender, educational
history, and their political ideology were systematically related
to perceptions of the protagonist and conceptions of depression.
We did not ﬁnd relationships between the participants’ age and
the dependent measures. Table 3 displays relationships between
the individual diﬀerences measures and the dependent measures
from data aggregated across all three experiments.
Since the individual diﬀerence measures were highly
correlated with one another in some cases (e.g., female
participants were more likely to report a history of depression,
χ2(1) = 4.614, p = 0.032) we ﬁt multiple regression models
to suggested treatments (logistic), empathy, attributions of
responsibility, judgments of depression as a disease, and
stigmatized attitudes toward depression. Participants who
reported that their sex was neither male nor female or who
declined to respond about their history with depression were
excluded from these analyses.
Participants with a history of depression responded diﬀerently
than participants who did not report a history of depression
on nearly every dependent measure. They were more likely
to suggest that the protagonist treat their symptoms with
medication, β = 0.657, SE = 0.108, p < 0.001, more likely to
empathize with the protagonist, β= 0.832, SE= 0.040, p< 0.001,
and less likely to attribute responsibility to the protagonist for
their experience, β = −0.185, SE = 0.044, p < 0.001. They were
also more likely to think of depression as a disease, β = 0.267,
SE = 0.043, p < 0.001, and less likely to hold stigmatizing
attitudes toward the condition, β = −0.530, SE = 0.041,
p < 0.001. These ﬁndings are generally consistent with prior
work showing how ﬁrst-hand experience with depression aﬀects
the way people think about the condition (e.g., Lebowitz et al.,
2013).
We also found diﬀerences by the gender and ideology of
participants. Women and liberals reported more empathy toward
the protagonist, β = 0.125, SE = 0.039, p < 0.001 and β = 0.128,
SE = 0.020, p < 0.001, attributed less responsibility to him
or her, β = −0.131, SE = 0.044, p = 0.003 and β = −0.118,
SE = 0.022, p < 0.001, were less likely to hold a stigmatizing
view of the condition, β = −0.301, SE = 0.041, p < 0.001 and
β = −0.173, SE = 0.020, p < 0.001, and were more likely to
think of depression as a disease, β= 0.216, SE = 0.043, p< 0.001
and β = 0.182, SE = 0.021, p < 0.001. Neither the gender of the
participant nor their political ideology aﬀected their treatment
suggestion.
These ﬁnding are consistent with recent research on
the relationship between gender, political ideology and folk
psychiatric reasoning in other domains like obesity and addiction
(e.g., Flusberg et al., 2015; Thibodeau et al., 2015). In addition, the
inﬂuence of political ideology is consistent with a conservative
worldview, where people are viewed as especially accountable for
their behavior and feelings (e.g., Skitka et al., 2002).
In addition, we found that participants with more education
attributed less responsibility to the protagonist, β = −0.047,
SE = 0.022, p = 0.028, and were less likely to hold a stigmatized
view of depression, β = −0.045, SE = 0.020, p = 0.024, also
consistent with prior work (e.g., Corrigan and Watson, 2007).
There were no relationships between participants’ education
level and treatment suggestions, empathy, or conceptions of
depression as a disease.
Finally, we considered the possibility of a gender congruence
eﬀect (e.g., Kulik and Holbrook, 2000): would females respond
more favorably to a female protagonist; would males respond
more favorably to a male protagonist? We found that the
relationship between the gender of the protagonist and
participant impacted judgments of depression as a disease,
F[1,2177] = 4.22, p = 0.032, but not treatment suggestions,
empathy, attributions of responsibility, or stigma, Fs < 2.6,
ps > 0.1. As noted above, females were more likely than males to
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TABLE 3 | Individual differences.
Treatment Empathy Responsibility Disease Stigma
History of depression 38% Rx [0.35, 0.41] 4.17 (0.52) 1.64 (0.62) 67.55 (27.60) 1.73 (0.49)
No history of depression 24% Rx [0.21, 0.27] 3.63 (0.55) 1.79 (0.59) 57.42 (26.57) 2.08 (0.53)
Female 31% Rx [0.28, 0.34] 4.01 (0.56) 1.65 (0.63) 66.84 (28.15) 1.78 (0.50)
Male 32% Rx [0.29, 0.35] 3.81 (0.62) 1.76 (0.58) 58.58 (26.34) 2.02 (0.55)
Pol affiliation
Democrat 33% Rx [0.29, 0.36] 3.94 (0.60) 1.68 (0.61) 64.62 (27.15) 1.88 (0.54)
Independent 28% Rx [0.24, 0.31] 3.89 (0.62) 1.72 (0.62) 60.15 (27.55) 1.93 (0.52)
Republican 35% Rx [0.31, 0.39] 3.88 (0.58) 1.74 (0.60) 62.58 (28.07) 1.89 (0.55)
Judgments regarding the protagonist and depression as a function of participants’ history with depression, gender, and political affiliation with data aggregated from
Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Percentages and confidence intervals are shown for treatment suggestions; means and standard deviations are shown for the other four
measures.
consider depression a disease. This was especially true when the
protagonist was female as compared to when the protagonist was
male, t[1048] = 2.154, p= 0.031 (see Table 4) and reveals partial
support of a gender congruence eﬀect – for women but not men.
DISCUSSION
In three experiments, we tested how labels and explanations for
a person’s depressive symptoms aﬀected views of this person
and conceptions of depression. Despite the laudatory goals
of recent messaging campaigns, we ﬁnd little evidence that
emphasizing the neurobiological basis of depression promotes
empathy, encourages people to view depression as a disease,
or that such a change leads to a reduction in attributions
of responsibility or stigmatizing attitudes. Emphasizing the
neurobiological underpinning of depression had the biggest eﬀect
on participants’ treatment suggestions – leading them to suggest
medication and therapy in most cases, rather than therapy
alone. This represents a valuable ﬁnding, as many studies have
found that the combination of psychotherapeutic and biological
treatments represents the most eﬀective means of dealing with a
variety of mental disorders, including depression (e.g., Elkin et al.,
1989; Bowers, 1990). That is, one positive eﬀect of describing
depression in biological terms is that it seems to shift peoples’
conception of how to treat depression to be more consistent with
treatment recommendations that have emerged from the medical
literature.
The results of all three experiments suggest that the degree
to which people view depression as a disease seems to anchor a
spectrum of depression-related attitudes. This is consistent with
other research on folk psychiatric reasoning, which suggests that
the biological or medical dimension plays a key role in how
people conceptualize and make decisions with respect to complex
health conditions (Haslam, 2005; Lebowitz et al., 2013, 2014;
Lebowitz and Ahn, 2014; Flusberg et al., 2015). In particular,
when the depression schema conforms to a disease model,
people tend to feel more empathy toward those suﬀering from
depressive symptoms, hold fewer stigmatizing attitudes toward
the condition, and attribute less responsibility to the individual
for the current situation they ﬁnd themselves in.
While the labeling and causal explanation manipulations did
little to shift people’s beliefs about whether or not depression
should be thought of as a disease, we found strong and consistent
eﬀects of a variety of individual diﬀerence measures on this
dimension of the depression schema. Speciﬁcally, people with a
history of depression, females, and liberals were more likely to
view depression as a disease. Such a view was related, in turn,
with more empathy, less attribution of responsibility, and less
stigma. This is largely consistent with research on the factors
that inﬂuence conceptions of other conditions like addiction
(Flusberg et al., 2015) and obesity (Thibodeau et al., 2015).
This set of ﬁndings is important because it reveals both the
wide range of variability in the depression schemas people have
in mind, as well as the factors that may shape the schema
any individual holds in particular. Identifying the inﬂuence
of the individual diﬀerence measures may also be valuable
to clinicians, educators, and policy makers when designing
educational interventions related to the nature and treatment of
depression.
TABLE 4 | Gender congruence.
Participant’s gender Protagonist’s gender Treatment Empathy Responsibility Disease Stigma
Female Female 30% [0.26, 0.35] 4.01 (0.54) 1.63 (0.66) 68.92 (26.82) 1.78 (0.50)
Female Male 32% [0.28, 0.36] 4.00 (0.58) 1.66 (0.61) 65.16 (29.08) 1.78 (0.50)
Male Female 34% [0.29, 0.39] 3.87 (0.64) 1.69 (0.57) 58.23 (27.17) 1.97 (0.55)
Male Male 30% [0.30, 0.34) 3.77 (0.60) 1.81 (0.57) 58.84 (25.74) 2.05 (0.54)
Judgments regarding the protagonist and depression as a function of the relationship between the gender of the participant and protagonist with data aggregated
from Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Percentages and confidence intervals are shown for treatment suggestions; means and standard deviations are shown for the other four
measures.
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Interestingly, prior work has in fact found that framing
manipulations can impact the extent to which people hold
a more biological or “medicalized” view of certain mental
disorders (Lebowitz and Ahn, 2014; Lebowitz et al., 2014).
It is possible that certain design features of our experiments
limited the eﬃcacy of the labels and explanations used
in the present set of studies. For instance, in all three
experiments the symptoms were described in detail at a
psychological or behavioral level (e.g., trouble sleeping), which
may overpower a subtle framing manipulation or a discussion of
the neurological basis of the disorder. Similarly, in Experiment 3
the protagonist was identiﬁed as suﬀering from depression even
in conditions in which the neurobiological basis of depression
was detailed, which may have constrained the inﬂuence of the
explanation.
As a result, we think it would be premature to conclude
that simply emphasizing the neurobiological underpinning
of depression is a poor strategy for changing certain
attitudes toward depression. Indeed, evidence from messaging
campaigns in the context of other health issues like anorexia
suggest that emphasizing the neurobiological component
of the disorder can be an important tool for promoting
the view of psychological disorders as a disease (e.g.,
Crisafulli et al., 2008. See also Lebowitz et al., 2014).
However, further work is needed to determine exactly
how to use this information eﬀectively in the context of
depression.
For instance, it may be important to describe the neurobiology
of depression in relation to the protagonist in particular.
In the present studies, the neurobiology of depression was
discussed at an abstract level: “Researchers have found a
number of abnormalities in the neurobiology of people with
depression.” However, it may be more valuable to make such
statements at a personal level: “Doctors have found a number
of abnormalities in the function of Mark/Jenny’s brain that
aﬀect his/her ability to regulate his/her mood.” Alternatively,
or in addition, it may be important to explicitly identify
depression as a disease (e.g., “depression is a brain disease”)
rather than simply frame a set of symptoms as the result
of a relatively ambiguous “neurological disorder.” These open
questions represent important opportunities for future work (but
see Lebowitz and Ahn, 2014; Lebowitz et al., 2014; Flusberg et al.,
2015).
Importantly, we do not ﬁnd evidence of a cost for emphasizing
the neurobiological underpinning of depression that has been
found or theorized by others (Phelan et al., 2006; Deacon and
Baird, 2009; Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2011; Lebowitz et al., 2013;
Lebowitz and Ahn, 2014). Reading that the protagonist was
suﬀering from a neurological disorder or an extended discussion
of the neurobiology of depression did not lead to an increase in
stigma or blame.
One additional take-away from these studies is that people
may view aspects of depression diﬀerently based on the gender of
the person showing symptoms of the disorder. For instance, we
found that the framing manipulation was more eﬀective in the
context of a female protagonist and that people were less likely
to attribute responsibility to a female protagonist suﬀering from
a disorder (either “depression” or a “neurological disorder”).
This may be because males are viewed as more agentive in
general (e.g., Eagly, 1987) or because depression is more common
among women (Piccinelli and Wilkinson, 2000). As a result,
people may be more compassionate in their evaluation of a
description of a female suﬀering from depression. However, on
most measures, we found no diﬀerences in how people evaluated
a male and female protagonist who was described as suﬀering
from depression.
In sum, this work represents a valuable step toward
understanding lay conceptions of depression, reveals an initial
empirically grounded eﬀort to characterize a lay schema for
depression, and oﬀers empirical evidence for some of the key
important factors that may inﬂuence these conceptions. These
ﬁndings are important not only in the context of clinical health
communications, but also for cognitive scientists interested in
how schematic knowledge guides reasoning and decision-making
in complex domains like mental illness.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
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